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ABSTRACT
Thisessay examines the role of economic research in affecting the
recommendations of the National Commission of Unemployment Compensation,
and the likely impacts of that Commission and economists' research findings
on policy. Using a questionnaire addressed to Commission members, I find
that most became quite aware of the results of research on the labor—
market effects of unemployment insurance, with the degree of recognition
proportional to the strength of the consensus among economists on a
particular result; that the members had little awareness of the identity
of particular economists who had done the research; and that, though the
members claimed their recommendations were influenced importantly by
research, that influence is difficult to detect in the Commission's
Report. Because thatReportgoes against the tenor of current labor—
market policy, its short—run impact will likely be small; and, because
the focus of interest in policy will change over time, its long—term
influence may not be great. Economic research, though, is shown to have
had an immediate impact in three specific cases; and its long—run effect,





EastLansing, MI 48824Unlike politicians, economists do not take opinion polls on their
performance. But we are prone to occasional self—examination, asking
whether all the articles, books and testimony in areas related to public
policy have done more than gain tenure and higher salaries for their
authors. Views on this issue have ranged from the remarkably optimistic
(Walter Heller on macro policy in the early l960s); to the modest
(George Stigler on a benefit—cost analysis of economics); to the very
negative (John Dunlop on labor economics). The self—examination here
deals with only one specific program, unemployment insurance. By
providing quantitative evidence linking research results with the percep-
tions of them by their consumers and their impact on policy, we can use
this small program to illuminate the broader issue of the utility of
economics.
Unemployment insurance (UI) is particularly well—suited for our
purposes. Empirical research on UI has clearly been one of the growth
stocks in labor economics since the early 1970s. This explosion coincided
with (andmay have been caused by) the persistent high unemployment during
this period and some major changes in UI policy. With the Pmendments of
1970 (P.L. 91—373), a permanent program of extended benefits (covering
weeks 27—39 of unemployment), to be triggered when unemployment is temporarily
high, became effective; coverage of wage and salary workers became nearly
universal with the 1976 Amendments (P.L. 94—566); for the first time,
Federal benefit standards (regulating receipt of UI benefits and retirement
income, and proscribing payments to teachers on summer vacation) were
instituted; and in 1979 some UI benefits became taxable as ordinary income
under P.L. 95—600.(See Daniel Hamermesh, 1977, for a discussion of these
changes and of the program's operating details.)—2—
The 1976 Amendments also provided for a National Commission on
Unemployment Compensation (NCUC) to study the program and make recommendations
for change. Its 13 members were appointed in 1977 and 1978 by the President,
the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and
included trade union, business and public representatives. A large
minority had a backround dealing with issues in UI. The NCUC held over 100
days of meetings and hearings, and issued a final report in Fall 1980.
Let us consider what economists have contributed to our knowledge of
the effects of UI, and then try to answer several questions: To what extent
were the NCUC's deliberations influenced by economic research, both that
funded by the NCUC and other work? What determined the direction of the
NCUC's recommendations? How will they and the economic research affect
policy in the 1980s ——inshort, what will be the net impact of the NCUC
and of our own work?
I. What Are the Economic Effects of UI?
The burgeoning interest in UI has generated impressive theoretical
and empirical results. Nonetheless, the major accretions to our knowledge
result from measuring impacts that were envisioned as long ago as
the l930s when the Federal mandate for state UI programs was first imposed.
In decreasing order of precision, the empirical findings (see Alan Gustman
for a recent summary) are:
1) The median UI recipient faces a replacement rate that is about half of
his after—tax earnings; and a substantial fraction, especially low—wage and
secondary workers, face net replacement rates in excess of three—fourths.
2) Higher net replacement rates induce longer spells of unemployment.
The nearly two dozen studies of this issue indicate fairly consistently that
a 20 percent increase in UI benefits induces between one half and one extra
week of measured unemployment (3 to 6 percent), other things equal. The—3—
NCUC funded some research projects that confirmed earlier results on this
point.
3) UI benefits accrue disproportionately to households in the third through
ninth (next to lowest) deciles of the income distribution; on net they
reduce the Cmi coefficient on after—tax incomes.
4) By providing incentives to stabilize employment fluctuations,
reduced experience rating of UI taxes (narrower rate structures on
tax schedules, and a lower taxable base) increases layoff rates and thus
the number of spells of unemployment. Here too, the NCUC supported research
that strengthened this conclusion. The size of the impact is unclear; estimates
of the effect of instituting a tax structure like that in the state with
the most complete experience rating range from a one percent to a 33 percent
reduction in the layoff rate in manufacturing.
5) Longer potential duration of benefits induces workers to stay unemployed
longer, other things equal, though less so in recessions. The estimates,
including one from a project funded by the NCUC, extend up to one extra
week of actual unemployment for each week of extra potential duration.
6) Perhaps one half of benefits accrues to persons whose
consumption would not be reduced in the absence of those benefits
(see, eg,,, Daniel Hamermesh,1982). Since the program's major goal is the
maintenance of a standard of living, this suggests the benefits are not
completely target efficient.
7) Broadened coverage, eased eligibility and higher weekly benefits and
potential duration induce workers to spend more time in the labor force.
This increases total market production, partly offsetting the lost production
implicit in points (2) and (5) above, though perhaps increasing the loss
in welfare.—4—
II. Awareness and Use of Economic Research
How did these findings, which include some of the most concrete
results in labor economics (or applied economics generally!) impinge
upon the NCUC? To examine this I distributed a short questionnaire to
the 12 Commission members who participated in the NCUC's work; nine responses
were made (anonymously). The answers on questions about awareness of
research findings, of producers of research, and of effects of policy
changes represent, to my knowledge, the first set of responses by such a
group to specific questions of this type.
On a scale from 4 ("Have seen summaries of the results and have a
good grasp of findings") down to 1 ("Am unfamiliar with research in this
area") the Commission members were asked to indicate their familiarity with
research on the effects of: 1) Longer potential duration and higher
weekly benefits on unemployment duration; 2) Experience—rated payroll taxes
on employment fluctuations; and 3) UI benefits on the distribution of
after-tax income. The respondents' claims of familiarity with research
results correspond remarkably closely to the degree of concreteness I
attached in the previous section to the results. On the first question the
average score was 3.7; on the second and third the scores were 2.7 and 2.6
respectively. If we can believe their claims, it appears that Commission
members were most aware of findings in those areas that have received the
most attention from economists.
The NCUC members were able to convert their familiarity with research
findings into an appreciation of the likely impact of some hypothetical
changes in UI policy on the labor market: 1) Raise potential duration to
65 weeks; 2) Tax all UI benefits; 3) Abolish experience rating of
payroll taxes. A question on the impact of UI benefits on the distribution
of income was also asked. On the policy questions the Commissioners were—5—
asked to indicate what effects, between —1.5 and +1.5 percentage points,
the change would have on the aggregate unemployment rate. The averages of
their responses about the likely impact of the three changes were +.6, —.2
amd +.3 percentage points respectively. Eight of the nine respondents stated
that UI benefits make the income distribution "somewhat more equal"; the
other stated they had no effect. Though one might quibble about these magnitudes,
they seem remarkably close to what a careful reading of research results
would lead one to expect. Whether the "accuracy" of these responses
stems from the Commissioners' general acuity or from the careful reading
of research findings is unclear. However, the lack of previous familiarity
of many Commissioners with the UI program, coupled with their responses
to the first set of questions, suggests that they did become knowledgable
about the latest economic research on the impact of the program they
were reviewing.
The Commissioners' familiarity with the results of economic research
did not extend to the recognition of the economists responsible for
the research results. Seven persons who had published two or more
articles or books on UI were listed in the questionnaire. The respondents
were asked to check whether or not they "were familiar with (had seen a
reference to or summary of) their work on UI." Also included were James
Braunfeld and Michael Hart, fictitious persons whose names (which are
dissimilar to those of any practicing labor economist I know of) I constructed.
One Commissioner was aware of Braunfeld's work; three were familiar with
Hart's work. Only three of the seven real economists achieved more
recognition than Hart. (Included among the four who did not was one
person who completed a project under contract to the NCUC.) One must conclude
that only three of the seven were really familiar to the Commissioners.
(As a partial check on this analysis, nine graduate students and recent
doctorates in economics were given this part of the questionnaire. The—6—
majority were not acquainted with the work of two of the seven real persons,
but none expressed familiarity with Braunfeld's or Hart's work.) Sic transit
gloria doctorum: Our works may we known, we often we are not!
III. Research and Recommendations
The Commission made recommendations on all facets of the Federal—state
UI program. While economic research has nothing to say about many of these
issues, it carries some clear implications for others. Most radical (and
costly) of these was a set of recommendations that the Congress impose
standards on state programs' average and maximum benefits. These standards were
opposed by only two to five members, nearly all of whom could be called business
representatives. Together these would, if implemented, increase program costs
by at least 15 percent ($1.3 billion if the changes had been applied in
fiscal year 1979), and would result in higher replacement rates and some
increase in unemployment. Despite their clear awareness of the research
results linking higher replacement rates and longer duration of unemployment,
and the evidence that many recipients do not "need" the income, five of the
nine Commissioners responding claimed research played a major role or some
useful role in determining the recommendations on these benefit standards.
The other four respondents stated research had no effect. In light
of the clear contradiction between the recommendations and the research
findings, this appraisal by the majority of the respondents seems strange
indeed. Comparing the recommendations to the research, most observors
would conclude that the latter had no impact, though it may have restrained still
more generous recommendations.
With three business and one state government representative dissenting
the Commission recommended that a permanent triggered (by state or national un-
employment rates) program of benefits for weeks 40 through 65 of potential duration—7—
be established. (This would make permanent the most generous extension enacted
during the 1974—75 recession.) Though the Commissioners indicated that a
nontriggered extension would raise aggregate unemployment by .6 percentage points
(see above), and though they were aware of the evidence on this issue, only
one of the nine respondents felt research did not affect this recommendation.
(One claimed it had a major role, two that it served some useful role, and five
that it had a slight role.) Here again there is a sharp contradiction among
Commissioners awareness of research results, their perceptions of how research
affected their recommendations, and those recommendations themselves.
The Commission's views on experience rating are somewhat mixed. It
recommended that minimum tax rates exceed zero, clearly reducing the scope
for experience rating; it also urged that maximum rates be sufficiently high
that the "vast majority of benefit payments are effectively charged." Also,
the Commission endorsed increases in the annual amount of wages subject to taxation,
which would also increase the extent of experience rating. Five of the
nine respondents felt research played a major role in affecting this
recommendation. However, these recommendations were aimed at infusing revenue
into the program; and the research referred to may have been work showing
revenue projections rather than the program's labor—markets impact. While
we thus cannot claim too close a link between economic research and the
NCUC's recommendations, at least some claim can be made that the NCUC's direction
is consistent with economists' findings.
The NCUC urged unanimously that Congress repeal the taxation of
UI benefits. Since benefits are only taxable if a family's taxable income
well exceeds the median, repeal would surely decrease the income—equalizing effect
of the program. The Commissioners were, as we saw, aware of the program's
effects in this context; either they could not or would not make the jump
to recognizing the disequalizing impact of their recommendation, or they—8—
did so but subordinated their interest in equalizing incomes to some
other goal. In this case, though, six of nine did respond that research
results had no impact on the recommendation, a response which seems quite
consistent with the facts.
Though Commission members had a reasonable knowledge of what economists
as a group (but not individually) have found, economic research seems to
have had little effect on the actual recommendations of the NCUC. This, despite
the Commissioners' implied belief to the contrary. Rather, one may conclude that
the NCUC's recommendations on those issues which economists have studied were
highly political, with the union and most of the public representatives aligned
against most of the Commission's business members. In most of these cases
the majority's position supported changes that would exacerbate the
negative side effects that UI produces on the labor market.
The Report can be summarized the same way Samuel Gompers summarized the
goals of organized labor ——MORE:Higher replacement rates, longer potential
duration of benefits, and easier eligibility for benefits. Regardless of one's
views on the appropriateness of these recommendations, it is difficult to
imagine a set of prescriptions that would be in more conflict with the massive
amounts of research on the labor—market impact of UI that economists have
produced in the past ten years. Despite their recognition of these effects,
the Commissioners may implicitly have viewed other factors, perhaps income
maintenance and macro stabilization, to be of greater importance. If they
did, their emphasis contradicts in part the evidence (point 6 in Section I) on
the program's target efficiency, and its necessity as an automatic stabilizer
(see Martin Feldstefn). So too, they may at least in part have acted out perceived
roles as representatives of groups with fixed positions on the issues. (This
seems to have happened in other commissions; see Robert Kilroy—Silk.)—9—
IV.Impact,Impact, WhoHasan Impact?
The picture in the previous section may appear bleak to those who seek an
immediate impact of economic research on the formulation of policy. Yet
economists' research findings have often had an immediate impact on policy, one
that the NCUC Report is not likely to obtain. Similarly, the long—run
effects of the economic research of the l970s on the UI program seems
likely to exceed that of the Report in those areas where the latter deals
with economic issues.
In three areas the Congressional staff personnel I interviewed, none
of whom had formal training in economics, indicated that economic research
provided part of the impetus for changing the UI program. The taxation of
benefits received by high—income families resulted partly from some examples
of high net replacement rates that were shown for some secondary workers who
are UI recipients. The demonstration that these reduced work incentives
produce longer spells of unemployment was also important. Similarly, the
final extension of Federal Supplemental Benefits (FSB) (P.L. 95—19) included the
first Federal requirement defining suitable work (jobs that UI recipients must
accept or face a cut—off of benefits) more broadly than its definition for
recipients of regular and Extended (weeks 1—39) benefits. This stipulation stemmed
in part from evidence produced in an analysis of the job—search behavior of
persons who had exhausted FSB payments. Finally, a study of the disqualification
of claimants of regular UI benefits led to Federal legislation disqualifying
them from receiving Extended Benefit payments. Even beyond its use to buttress
proposed legislation, economic research has had a direct effect on those
areas where Federal policy affects UI programs.
This role stands in sharp contrast to the likely immediate impact
of the recommendations of the NCUC. The NCUC members were appointed by a
Democratic President, Speaker and President Pro Tempore; the Report was filed—10---
just before a Republican President and President Pro Tempore assumed power.
Examination of recent legislation (P.L. 97—35) and discussions with staff persons
in both the executive and legislative branches indicate that the Commission's
recommendations in the areas where economists have provided evidence of the pro-
gram's impact will be ignored at least through 1984. (In other areas,
such as providing for states with large deficits in their UI accounts, where
program requirements dictate legislative action be taken, the NCUC's proposals
may well have a major effect.) Indeed, the current Administration's proposals
run counter to those presented by the Report. For example, imposing a Federal
standard requiring UI recipients to have worked at least 20 weeks in the base
period to receive benefits beyond 13 weeks of unemployment (97th Cong., S. 983)
represents an extreme interpretation of studies of UI and unemployment duration.
Ideology and political influence dominate most proposals that have been made
in the last ten years for UI policy, as one should expect in a program that
affects directly so many employers and workers.
The long—run impact of the NCUC Report obviously cannot be foretold.
Nonetheless, the role that previous reports in other areas have played
suggests that, should conditions arise after 1984 that spur changes in the
program, the politics will be such as to dictate a different mix of
influences, and thus a different political outcome, from those that generated
this Report. It seems unlikely, in the crucial areas of benefit standards,
policy on potential duration, taxation of benefits, etc., that the Report's
long—term impact will exceed the short—run effects.
This stands in sharp contrast to the likely future effects of the research
on UI that economists have done since 1973, including that funded by the NCUC.
Examination of the three cases cited above where research directly affected
changes in policy suggests one should not expect future policy changes to
arise directly out of past research: To affect changes in policy, research—11—
results must be recent. However, the increased certainty about the impact of
UI on the economy that has been provided by this spurt of research findings will,
as it has to some extent already, condition the debate over any future changes
in the program. One may reasonably conclude that the NCUC's major legacy, in
terms of its eventual impact on policy, may be the aid it gave to the
accretion of knowledge about the program. This conclusion and the contrast
between the short—run effects of prior economic research and the Commission's
recommendations suggest strongly that we economists should feel our
contributions in this area have been and will continue to be important. Whether
the same fairly optimistic inference can be drawn about economic research on other
topics is unclear. At the very least, though, the case of unemployment insurance
should provide some insight into the circumstances necessary for that research
to have an impact on policy.—12—
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